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Prosecuting Domestic Abuse in England and Wales: Crown Prosecution Service  ?working 




The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) regards offences of ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞĂƐ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ
ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ?  ?W^ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶĂ ‘ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?W^ ? ? ? ? ?a). 
This article examines how criminal prosecutors in England and Wales approach cases of 
intimate partner abuse in practice, specifically at the point when a complainant no longer 
wishes to support the prosecution. It first introduces  ‘EĞǁWƵďůŝĐDĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? (NPM). 
This is the lens through which the qualitative responses of a sample of 9 prosecutors are 
thematically analysed. Second, the primary research indicates a prosecutorial tendency or 
 ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?in 2017 disinclined to terminate cases on request, prompting instead the 
routine or habitual use of  ‘witness summons ? ?Third, the article exposes how techniques of 
NPM have contributed to the identified  ‘working practice ? often in concealed and 
unintended ways. Managerial priorities in this context appear to have restricted the free 
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƐĚŝƐcretion to take decisions on a case by case basis. The 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇĂre considered. 
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Introduction 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is charged with the responsibility of implementing the 
 ‘ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?in England and Wales (Bennion, 1986: 3). Its inception in 
 ? ? ? ?ĐĂŵĞŽŶƚŚĞďĂĐŬŽĨĐĞŶƚƵƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ŶŽƚŽƌŝŽƵƐůǇƌĂŵƐŚĂĐŬůĞ ? police prosecutions that had 
been piecemeal in approach and undirected and non-uniform across geographies (Bennion, 
1986: 3). In a bid to bring consistency, the CPS now routinely publishes policy objectives to 
guide individual prosecutorial discretionary decision making. In the area of intimate partner 
abuse, echoing ƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂŶĚthe UK 
government ?Ɛ wider strategy to end Violence Against Women and Girls (HM Government, 
2016), CPS policy confirms ŝƚŝƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌŝŶŐ ‘ƚŽďƌŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐƚŽũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?W^ ?
2017a).  
The first CPS domestic violence policy statement came in 1993. It pledged to prosecute all 
evidentially viable cases in the public interest in a bid to address wider concerns that the 
criminal justice system (CJS) was failing to do enough to protect abused women in the 
private sphere (House of Commons Report from the Select Committee on Violence in 
Marriage, 1975; Gottschalk, 2006). It also followed specific criticism of the CPS that too few 
cases were being charged, too many cases were having charge levels reduced and that 
discontinuance rates were too high (Burton, 2008; 93; Cretney and Davis, 1997; 147- 8). The 
CPS was only therefore delivering  ‘ŵŽĚĞƐƚĂĐŚŝĞǀeŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƐƵĐŚĐĂƐĞƐ (Cretney and Davis, 
1997; 147). Despite police services simultaneously introducing pro-arrest policies in 1993 
(Hoyle and Sanders, 2000; 17) the CPS policy statement resulted in insignificant shifts in 
working practices. Consequently, in 2005 there came a CPS policy restatement and, 
alongside it, mandatory domestic violence training for all prosecutors (CPS, 2008). Training 
was delivered nationally between 2005 to 2008 and definitively signalled the ĐƌŝŵĞ ?Ɛ 
augmented priority within the organisation (Hall, 2012; 143- 149).  
Current Domestic Abuse Guidelines for Prosecutors continue to regard the offence as 
 ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ? ?W^ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?PS, 2017a). As such, the CPS celebrates its 
year on year increases to the domestic abuse conviction rate which last year saw, once 
again, its highest ever recorded rate: 75.7% (CPS, 2017a). Such open and unqualified 
celebration of the improved rate of convicted offenders inevitably sets the tone that 
 ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞW^ĞƋƵĂƚĞƐƚŽĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
Nonetheless victim withdrawal from the criminal justice process remains a significant 
obstacle to successful domestic abuse convictions (ONS, 2016; CPS, 2016).1 Prosecutors 
must therefore regularly confront the question of how to proceed when the victim 
expresses her wish for discontinuance. Succinctly put, prosecutors can either accede to her 
request2 or decide to pursue the prosecution, absent her support.3  ‘sŝĐƚŝŵůĞƐƐ ? prosecutions 
can be achieved where a  ‘realistic prospect of conviction ?4 exists without requiring the 
victim to give evidence at trial, provided other corroborative evidence allows. Such evidence 
might include police body worn video footage, 999 emergency calls, medical records of 
injuries or third-party witness testimony (see Bettinson and Bishop, 2017).5 However, 
alternative evidential opportunities are not always available hence prosecutors may request 
the court issue a summons ƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶĚĂŶĐĞĂƚƚƌŝĂů ?6  
Using data from nine semi-structured interviews with prosecutors based in the South of 
England, the article examines ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĂďůĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?or typical way of 
proceeding, when the complainant withdraws, can be identified (see methodology below). 
It explores ŚŽǁƐƚĂƚĞĚW^ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽ ‘ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĞ ? ?W^ ? ? ? ? ?a) Violence Against Women are 
performed by this sample in practice. Despite CPS guidance to prosecutors asserting that to 
ĐŽŵƉĞůŽƌ ‘ƐƵŵŵŽŶƐ ?ĂŶƵŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƚŽŐŝǀĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂƚƚƌŝĂůƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ‘ůĂƐƚƌĞƐŽƌƚ ? ?W^ ? ? ? ? ? ?, the primary research reveals that prosecutors in the 
sample in fact routinely rely on summons (albeit there are preliminary indications that 
prosecutors are beginning to step back from this presumption to summons). Having 
identified a tendency or  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? of prosecutorial reliance on summons, the article 
uncovers how techniques of New Public Managerialism have contributed, often in 
clandestine ways, to restrict the true free exercise of prosecutorial discretion to consider DA 
on a case by case basis.  
The article therefore contributes to and updates existing knowledge about prosecutorial 
 ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞ(DA) cases. Moreover, it makes the original observation 
about how techniques of New Public Managerialism can operate to restrict professional 
discretion in the CPS, encouraging here the use of witness summons. Such a habitual 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŚĂƐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚimpacts the potential of criminal 
justice intervention to contribute to empowering outcomes for her. Before outlining the 
 ‘working practice ? and its emergence in the context of managerial demands, the article 
outlines its methodology and its lens, New Public Managerialism. 
Methodology 
This research was made possible as a result of a scholarship fund granted by Kent Law 
School. Having obtained ethical approval from the School, I wrote individually to 
prosecutors inviting them to take part, anonymously, in the research. As the project became 
known locally, prosecutors I had not approached directly volunteered themselves and gave 
me contact details of other potential interviewees. The sample was thus built from my initial 
ůŽĐĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ‘ƐŶŽǁďĂůůŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞwas 
drawn from one CPS area in the South of England; a region comprising rural areas and urban 
and coastal conurbations.  
Despite the diversity of the region and the CPS organisational structure being representative 
of the institution as a whole, caution must be exercised in suggesting the potential for 
national generalisability of the primary research; mindful in particular of the ƐĂŵƉůĞ ?Ɛsmall 
scale. It is possible that the  ‘ǁŽrking practice ? identified in the sample might have evolved 
within local offices and subsequently re-enforced between proximate colleagues. Given the 
limitations of the sample due to its size and geographic confines, the value of the work is 
not to assert a conclusive state of affairs ŽƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝǀĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?. Rather, as the 
sample reveals an area tendency for prosecutors in 2017 to rely on summons, its value is to 
stimulate and animate CPS institutional reflection on one hand and to contribute to 
literature that explores managerial influences on professional decision-making on the other.  
Interviews were guided by the use of a semi-structured interview schedule. The schedule 
ĂĐƚĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƚŽƉŝĐŐƵŝĚĞ ? ?Ğůů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽŵƉƚŝŶŐŵĞƚŽĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚĂƌĞĂƐŽĨĞŶƋƵŝƌǇďƵƚ
allowing me flexibility in terms of sequencing the questions. The approach also allowed me 
some latitude to explore each topic in depth (Yin, 2003) particularly where responses were 
felt to be significant (Bryman, 2012). The questions were largely open questions which 
invited extended, or rich (Weick, 2007) responses from the participant prosecutor, thus 
ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚŝŶŐĂŶƐǁĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶƚĞƌŵƐŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚŽƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇŵĞ ?
Interviews were audio recorded and transcripts were prepared for analysis. Transcripts were 
sent by email for participant comment and/ or amendment. On two occasions I sought 
clarification with respondents by email.  
During the thematic analysis, I familiarised myself with the data before coding and 
identifying themes (Braun and Clark, 2006). Using Nvivo software, I was able to review each 
theme allowing me to refine both the specific theme and consider broader overarching 
patterns based on frequency and significance for the participants. In this way, it became 
clear that managerialism was a factor that was often playing an unacknowledged part in 
many of the themes identified as influencing prosecutorial decision-making. As an active 
researcher I acknowledge my own theoretical and lived position in relation to the data 
(Braun and Clark, 2006) particularly as a former employee and current freelance agent of 
ƚŚĞW^ ?ĞŝŶŐĂǁĂƌĞŽĨŵǇŽǁŶ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚ ?Ǉ ? ? ?DĂƵƚŚŶĞƌĂŶĚ
Doucet, 1998) means that I acknowledge my role in formulating the interview process and 
the end product. Despite this, throughout the data gathering process and interpretative 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ/ĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƚŽĂƉƉůǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘Ăƌƚ ?ƌŝŐŽƌĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ƚŽƵŶĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?
meanings and implicatŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞƐ ? ?tĂƚƚƐ ? ? ? ? ?). Before explaining how NPM shapes 
W^ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐ its strategies and methods. 
 
New Public Managerialism 
 
dŚĞŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůůĚŽŵĂŝŶƐďǇƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝƐƐĞŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
economic principles everywhere is well identified (Larner, 2000; Harvey, 2005; Brown, 
2015). Economic ideologies permeate state institutions even where monetary profit is not 
considered the end goal. Through the rise of neoliberal governance, political and business 
idiolects converge and shape everyday conduct. /ĨŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵŝƐĂŶ ‘ĂƌƚŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?
(Foucault, 2004; 131) then, in the public sector, the tenets of New Public Managerialism 
(NPM) are its masterpiece and the CPS is, I suggest, its quintessence. 
In dogmatic neoliberal doctrine market competition is considered a virtue and, at its most 
ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĂŝƌĞ ?ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵǁŽƵůĚĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůůƐƚĂƚĞĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? (Bell, 2011: 
140). But the CPS has not been privatised and in the absence of other organisations 
competing for its core business, the CPS is effectively encouraged to compete with itself for 
improved conviction rates, victim satisfaction, efficiency and meeting reduced budgetary 
targets year on year. In this way, the principles of competition can be seen to operate within 
the four walls of the CPS.  New Public Managerialism is visible in public sector institutions 
such as health and social services, education, local government (Exworthy and Halford 1999; 
Stoker; 1999) and was introduced into the criminal justice system by the New Labour 
government (1997- 2010) to reduce inefficiency (McGlaughlin et al, 2001). NPM expects 
value for money and productivity and it demands this through system modernisation and 
the delivery of core quality standards.7  Managerialism tends to conceal its profit motives (or 
ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞW^ŝƚƐŵŽŶĞǇƐĂǀŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƐǇŶŽŶǇŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ
ŐŽĂůƐ ? Žƌ ‘ŽƌŐĂŶŝsĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?<ŝůŬĂƵĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?: 1106) and strives for legitimacy through 
its quest for productivity, performing self-regulation through regular monitoring of targets. 
&ƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞW^ǁĂƐƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚďǇ ‘ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůƵƐĞŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? (Philips, 1981). Thus, the Prosecution of 
Offences Act 1985 set the expectation that the CPS would make financial savings. 
Conservative politicians at the time were also simultaneously wedded to the idea that sheer 
numbers of police officers, prosecutions and punitive sentencing would have long term 
deterrent effect (McGlaughlin et al, 2001: 302). Flowing from this premise, coupled with a 
drive for economy and efficiency, it is easy to draw parallels between the way 
managerialism has operated in the Crown Prosecution Service ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŝŵĞĂŶĚWĂĐŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
Crime Control Model (Packer, 1964: 9). The Crime Control Model, according to Packer, aims 
to repress crime through efficiency in achieving large numbers of convictions; speed and 
finality are prized. By operating a conveyor belt system of justice where cases are dealt with 
in an efficient, routinised and even stereotyped way, the obstacles to conviction, Packer 
observes, are diminished. The Crime Control Model proceeds with high volume and, 
notably ? ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞŵŽĚĞůƚŚĂƚǁŝůůŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇŽŶƚŚĞƐĞƉƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŵƵƐƚďe an 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĂůŵŽƐƚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŵŽĚĞů ? (Packer, 1964: 11). 
Managerialism is not then ƐŝŵƉůǇĂ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ďƵƚĂŶideology that uses 
ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌŝĐƚŽŽůƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŽ ‘ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝƚƐĞůĨƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇŝŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
(Kilkauer, 2015: 1106). ƐĂŶ ‘Ăůů-ƉĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞ ?ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ, managerialism has infiltrated  ‘ĞǀĞƌǇ
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? (Garland, 2001; 18) and re-structuring on these principles is widely 
evident in England and Wales. For example, the prison estate has been privatised, court 
delay and inefficiency are routinely monitored (Leveson, 2015), forensic science work is 
 ‘contracted out ? to the private sector following closure of the unprofitable government 
owned Forensic Science Service in 2010 and, the Offender Management Act 2007 sees 
corporate trusts compete to run probation services. Moreover, just as the police, the CPS is 
required to state policy objectives and measure key performance targets. Such changes 
have led to accusations that substantive justice goals appear usurped by the pursuit of 
administratively rational ends (Jones, 1993). 
It has also been suggested that the effect of  ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
measures [has been the narrowing of] professional discretion [within] tightly regulated 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? (Garland, 2001: 18). Restricting or even depriving employees of decision-
making powers results in a de-ƐŬŝůůŝŶŐŽƌĚŽǁŶŐƌĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŽƌƐŬŝůůĞĚǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
role (Kilkauer, 2015: 1106). This de-skilling may in part have something to do with the 
expansion of management personnel who are tasked with overseeing operations.8  But it 
may also be to do with introduction of systems and standardised ways of working aimed at 
facilitating efficiency. This, paradoxically, also sees non-managerial staff entrusted with 
delegated responsibilities premised on individual  ‘initiative ? being performed within clearly 
stated organisational aims or parameters. This apparent contradiction between the 
expansion of management personnel and yet the re-placement of hierarchical decision 
making (Jones, 1993; 189) exposes how managerialism, just as its umbrella ideology 
neoliberalism, may not enjoy rigid intransigent theory. Rather, it might be considered 
instrumentalist, pragmatically embracing  ‘ǁŚĂƚǁŽƌŬƐ ? ?WĞĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? to streamline 
processes and save money. The resulting reduction or narrowing of professional decision-
making discretion is explored through the empirical research presented here. 
As the CPS is tasked with prosecuting  ‘on behalf of the public and not just in the interests of 
ĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? ?W^ ? ? ? ? ?b), state and prosecutor interests are considered 
ƐǇŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?Ɛ. This is because ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ
should serve both public and offender (Matravers, 2010). In the past, the approach 
attracted criticism as it was perceived that, once the wheels of justice had started rolling, 
the criminal justice system often marginalised victims, relegating and subsuming her 
interests by the greater good (Garland, 2001; 121). However, now considered consumers in 
the market place of criminal prosecutions, victims ought to be  ‘ĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů
justice system (QueeŶ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?; their interests fore fronted. However, as the primary 
research indicates, managerialism ?Ɛ common-sense language (who could be against 
efficiency and improved conviction rates?) can depoliticise relevant issues (Lacey, 1991) and 
de-centre the status of the victim. In the case of intimate partner abuse, I argue that 
managerialism obscures CPS substantive commitments to consider female victims of 
violence on a case by case basis ?ůĂǇŝŶŐďĂƌĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƐĂŶĚ
contradictions. Thus the  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďĞůŽǁ (the routine use of summonsing 
reluctant victims of intimate partner abuse) is, I argue, consistent with and fortified by the 




Broadly speaking, prosecuting authorities might take three approaches to domestic abuse 
cases where the victim is no longer supportive. Firstly, there is discontinuance as requested 
ďǇƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐ-ĚƌŽƉ ? ?Nichols, 2014; 2120). This appears 
to have been the CPS approach prior to 2008 (Cretney and Davis, 1996) when complainant 
retraction in the context of prŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ ‘ĂŶĂůŵŽƐƚ
ƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ?ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂŶĐĞ ? ?ůůŝƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? 
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƉƵƌƐƵĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŽƌ
whether her personal interests are best met by that ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?EŝĐŚŽůƐŚĂƐĐĂůůĞĚƚŚŝƐ ‘ŶŽ-ĚƌŽƉ ?
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶĂ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞ
social structures that permit violence against women (Nichols, 2014). This was the approach 
operating in CPS practice in 2009 immediately following revised guidelines, policy and 
ŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŝŵĞĚĂƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐƉƌĂǆŝƐŽĨ ‘ĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĚƌŽƉ ? ?,Ăůů ?
2012; 143- 149).  
KƌƚŚŝƌĚůǇ ?ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐŵĂǇǁĞŝŐŚƵƉĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ
and/ or sense of autonomy might be best met through either course. Current CPS guidelines 
for prosecutors indicate that whilst there is a presumption to prosecute, prosecutors must 
weigh up the practical, personal and safety reasons outlined in her retraction statement and 
contained within the police  ‘risk assessment ? before deciding how to proceed. Retraction 
statements must contain her reasons for withdrawing from the prosecution. Statement 
takers must specifically include information about whether the perpetrator has intimidated 
her into withdrawing. Prosecutors are therefore reliant on the police to obtain fair and 
accurate accounts. However, as her intention in making the statement is to stop 
proceedings, the expectation that she would then disclose a further offence of witness 
intimidation is clearly compromised. dŚŝƐƚŚŝƌĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂƐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůǇďĞĞŶĐĂůůĞĚĂ ‘victim-
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? (Catteneo et al, 2009) ? ‘ƐƵƌǀŝǀŽƌ-ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ? ?'ŽŽĚŵĂŶ et al, 2016) Žƌ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵ
ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚ ? (Hoyle and Sanders, 2000) approach. The CPS has never named the 
approach but existing domestic abuse policy most closely advocates prosecutors emulate 
this  ‘ƐƵƌǀŝǀŽƌ-ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ?ǁĂǇ. 
The first approach, routinely acceding to her wishes and dropping the case accordingly, can 
be advantageous to the extent that it demonstrates that the criminal justice system is 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞǁĂŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?tŝŶŝĐŬŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ďĞŝŶŐŚĞĂƌĚ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŝƐ
 ‘ǀŝƚĂůƚŽĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŚĞƌŽǁŶůŽĐƵƐŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ĂŶĚ ?ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůǁĞůů-ďĞŝŶŐ ?
(Winick, 2000: 64). She may withdraw from the prosecution because arrest alone achieved 
cessation of the immediate behaviour as intended or she may have weighed up that the 
costs of prosecution (breakdown of the family structure, loss of financial support, increased 
risk of violent retaliation) outweigh the potential benefit of prosecution outcomes. Having 
her wishes actioned is likely to instil a sense that the CJS is not impersonal, impervious or 
even coercive, rather it is sensitive and respectful to the victim. Moreover, being victim 
reactive might forge a sense of trust in the victim to call on the criminal justice system in the 
future in the knowledge that victim preference is recognised (Buzawa et al, 2000; 17). 
 
hŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐůǇĂĐĐĞĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ however, is not without notable 
shortcomings. Advocates of no-drop prosecutions (Wills, 1997; Stark, 1993; Sacuzzo, 1998), 
often cite the transfer of power to the abuser if victim withdrawal is habitually assented. He 
may pursue violence, intimidating tacƚŝĐƐŽƌ ‘ĂƉŽůŽŐĞƚŝĐŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽĐŽĞƌĐĞ
the victim into retracting, knowing that her retraction will have the effect of terminating his 
prosecution (Nichols, 2015; 2117). No-drop prosecution averts the potential for this power 
transfer to the perpetrator, ensuring that the burden of whether or not to prosecute is 
ƚĂŬĞŶŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐŚĂŶĚƐ ?Additionally, no-drop prosecutions which remove, or largely 
ƌĞŵŽǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶƚŽĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ often 
victims cannot be relied upon to bring offenders to account - either because they retract, 
minimise, or fail to attend court. Wills reminds us that this is because  ‘ŵĂŶǇďĂƚƚĞƌĞĚ
women fail to see that criminal intervention can assist in the shared goal of getting their 
ĂďƵƐĞƌƚŽƐƚŽƉƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? (Wills, 1997; 178). Requiring criminal intervention therefore 
ensures any benefit that the victim might receive from CJS is facilitated. 
 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝĨŝƚŝƐƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽƌĂŝŵƚŽŬĞĞƉǁŽŵĞŶƐafe, no-drop prosecutions 
appear to contradict the effort. Many women who have experienced no-drop practices 
subsequently lose confidence in criminal justice agents ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĐƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ, 
even in moments of future emergency (Buzawa et al, 2000).9 Acknowledging potential 
benefits of both approaches, the third strategy recognises that inflexibly pursuing the 
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŝŶƚǁŽďĂƐŝĐĨŽƌŵƐ ?ŝƚŵŝŐŚƚĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐƌŝƐŬ
of harm whilst being involved in proceedings or immediately after (absent protections such 
as safe housing or defendant remand into custody) or it might instil victim reluctance to call 
police in an emergency in the future (Catteneo et al, 2009: 1229). Particularly in the United 
States the practice has been shown to work against non-white and poor women bearing in 
mind the immigration and child custody consequences of involving the State (Maguigan, 
2003: 433). 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘survivor defined ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐƚŚĂƚŶŽ-drop prosecutions can 
ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?tŚŝůƐƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
decision may not be entirely free because it is formed in coerced circumstances, the third 
approach understands the decision might still be entirely considered. For that reason, a 
ǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐǁŝƐŚĞƐŽƵŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽďĞŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĂƐĂƌŝƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌ
ŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚŽƌ ‘ůĞĂƌŶĞĚŚĞůƉůĞƐƐŶĞƐ ? ?tĂůŬĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?:ŽŶĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞ
other. The decision may be formed by someone with astute awareness, acting wisely in the 
circumstances bearing in mind personal, practical or safety factors, particularly if she 
intends to maintain the relationship ?dŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĂŶĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌŝůǇ ?ĨŽƌŵƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞaring in mind the autonomy 
ĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨĞĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐǁŝƐŚĞƐ ?dŚŝƐĐĂƐĞďǇĐĂƐĞ ? ‘ƚŚŝƌĚǁĂǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞ
approach that the CPS ostensibly adopts in its policy (CPS, 2017a) and guidelines (CPS, 
2014). The following section uses the primary research to consider the extent to which it is 
actually practiced.  
Prosecutorial  ?working practice ? in 2017 
Of the sample of nine prosecutors interviewed,10 three prosecutors with sufficiently long 
tenure were indeed able to identify that prior to 2005, domestic abuse cases had tended to 
be routinely discontinued absent victim support (see also Cretney and Davies, 1996). They 
also recalled how revised policy and guidelines in 2005 accompanied by mandatory training 
between 2005-8 endeavoured to address routine discontinuance. The new policy and 
guidelines encouraged pursuance of prosecutions, safety considerations permitting, but 
emphasised that a nuanced balancing of evidential and public interest factors was still 
necessary.  
 
In practice, however, the new policy, guidelines and training appeared implemented as a 
tenacious pursuit and translated into, 
 
 ‘Just push it and push it as far as it will ŐŽ ? (Prosecutor 1). 
 
Meaning that after 2008 the perception was that unsupportive victims were invariably being 
required by prosecutors to come to court to testify, despite their stated wish to have the 
matter terminated. This insight accords with research conducted by Hall in 2009 in which a 
Chief Crown Prosecutor attested that summons would now ďĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ?ǁĂǇƚŽƉƌŽĐĞĞĚ
absent victim support (Hall, 2009; 145).  
 
Eleven years later in 2017, prosecutors I interviewed were not so clear about the 
advantages summons offered. Prosecutors were now, largely, aware of the complexity 
pertaining to the decision to prosecute absent a supportive complainant. Prosecutor 2 
understood the matter to be finely balanced and the factors he cited as relevant in deciding 
how to proceed were typical of those expressed by most prosecutors interviewed. The 
factors he weighed up fell into two broad categories. The first had to do with the 
seriousness of the offence; whether children were present, the extent of the injury and 
whether the defendant had like previous convictions. These are features of the offence that 
traditionally aggravate the sentence and are therefore aspects that are more likely to justify 
and require punishment and condemnation through prosecution if present.  The other 
factors had more to do with risk assessment; whether there was a history of violence and 
whether parties were likely to reconcile. The implication was that if there was a history of 
violence and if parties were more likely to continue a relationship the more likely it would 
be that the case merited prosecution due to increased risk to the victim. Prosecution was 
seen to carry advantages in these circumstances because bail conditions prohibiting the 
defendant from contacting the victim would likely continue and because ultimately 
sentence would serve to protect the victim from future harm.  
 WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ?ƐǁĞŝŐŚŝŶŐƵƉŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨactors was reflective of the approach most prosecutors 
ƐĂŝĚƚŚĞǇĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ?dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĂůůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚƚƌĞĂƚĞĚƚŚĞǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƐĂƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĨŽƌ
considering the merits of ongoing prosecution but retraction appeared, at least in the 
absence of stating it expressly, not to act as a factor to be weighed into the mix. It seems 
ƚŚĂƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞƐǁĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐŚĞĂƌĚŽŶůǇƚŽƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝƚƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ
the case, not to the extent that acceding to what she wanted might also have been 
considered to have empowering value or have been the right thing to do given her unique 
understanding of the power dynamic between her and her abuser. 
 
Whilst most prosecutors professed to employing a more detailed analysis of the advantages 
and disadvantages of summonsing the reluctant witness, 6 out 9 prosecutors perceived that 
significant numbers of colleagues were still obtaining a summons as a matter of routine. 
Prosecutor 4 summed up the position; 
 
 ‘IĨƐŚĞ ?ƐƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůůǇƐĂǇŝŶŐƐŚĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĂƚƚĞŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŶ I think the CPS do 
ƚĞŶĚƚŽƐƵŵŵŽŶƐ ? ?
 
This suggests that even though prosecutors may be engaging with the possibility of not 
summonsing, they are reluctant to discontinue cases and frequently engage the practice in 
any event. Prosecutor 2 expressed concern that habitual use of summons, in essence Ă ‘ŶŽ-
ĚƌŽƉ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ, was being favoured by colleagues simply because it is  
 
 ‘ƚŚĞĞĂƐǇǁĂǇƚŽĚŽŝƚ ? ? ? ?>Ğƚ ?ƐŝƐƐƵĞĂƐƵŵŵŽŶƐ ? ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ŵĂǇďĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŝƚĂƐ
ŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ ? ? 
dŚƌĞĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐ ?ĂůůǁŽŵĞŶ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĞĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐǀŽŝĐĞŽƌ
preference and how facilitating empowering outcomes might be dependent upon a 
respectful consideration of her preference. Victim retraction was considered  
 ‘ƚŚĞŚĂƌdest thing for us. Because at what point do you intervene and potentially 
ŽǀĞƌƌƵůĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŝƐŚĞƐ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ? ? 
Showing awareness of the potential for secondary victimisation and the fallibility of the CJS 
more generally, another of the three prosecutors suggested that instead of forcing victims 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂƵŵĂ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? 
 ‘if that can be avoided and a positive outcome achieved where the victim is safe and 
ůĞĂĚĂ QƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ?ŚĂƉƉǇůŝĨĞƚŚĞŶƐƵƌĞůǇƚŚat is the better thing to do? 
Decisions really have to be made on a case by case basis and these kind of blanket 
ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬĂƌĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŝŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĐĂƐĞƐ. ? (Prosecutor 5).  
This prosecutor considered whether a non-conviction restraining order in combination with 
a police referral to domestic abuse support agencies would be sufficient to protect the 
unsupportive victim, whilst affording the opportunity to adhere to her wishes.  
However, despite themselves demonstrating awareness of occasions when prosecution may 
not be preferable, prosecutors 5 and 7 were more than aware that not all their colleagues 
approached DA in the same way. They expressed concern that other colleagues and 
managers (with whom they had to consult and ultimately defer- see below) regularly 
summonsed victims, treating them as hostile witnesses at trial if necessary.  
Three of the nine prosecutors however indicated that the tendency to rely on summons is 
diminishing. This readjustment appears to have been prompted by recent ongoing e-
learning training in 2016- 17 which, according to prosecutors, highlighted the potential 
problems with the use of summonsing and promoted preference for evidence-led (or 
victimless prosecutions) where the victim is no longer supportive. This was delivered in four 
mandatory modules and required prosecutors to work through case studies (Prosecutor 2).  
Prosecutor 1 outlined the shift that he perceived followed,  
 ‘/ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚ ? ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐĂŐŽ ?ŵŽƐƚƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĨŝƌƐƚ
reaction to a withdrawal would have been to appoint a witness summons. It kind of 
takes the decision out of their hands. They don't need to worry. Just send the 
summoŶƐ ? ?
But he went on to identify that since the recent training about victimless prosecutions,  
  ‘/ĚŽƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƐŽƚƌŝŐŐĞƌŚĂƉƉǇ ? ? 
WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ?ĂĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞ ‘ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶ ?11 agreed that,  
 ‘ĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƚĞŶĚĞŶcy to not necessarily summons. To look at cases as 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĞĐŝĚĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶǇŵĞƌŝƚŝŶƐƵŵŵŽŶƐŝŶŐ ? ?
The third prosecutor ǁŚŽĚŝĚŶŽƚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?was relatively new to the 
service having worked there for just over a year. She herself observed and practiced 
tenacious DA prosecutions but was the only prosecutor not to identify routine summonsing 
had been practiced previously or still did occur. She suggested that the practice is  
  ‘ŶŽƚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚ ?/ƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞůĂƐƚƌĞƐŽƌƚ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ? ? 
The latest training, undertaken by recently recruited prosecutor 8, might provide an 
explanation for why she was the only prosecutor not to identify there is or ever was a 
practice of routine summonsing and suggests that there is sensitive and positive change 
ĂĨŽŽƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ǀŝĐƚim-informed ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
Despite evidence that since training in 2016- 17 prosecutors may be beginning to draw back 
and not assume summonsing is always desirable, according to eight of the nine prosecutors 
in the sample, the practice appears to have been cultivated between 2008- 2016-17. The 
approach is akin to  ‘no-drop ? prosecution praxis, ĂƚůĞĂƐƚŝŶŝƚƐ ‘ƐŽĨƚĨŽƌŵ ? ?ƵǌĂǁĂĂŶĚ
Buzawa, 1996). The next section examines how managerial pressures may have contributed 
to the tendency despite guidance that clearly advocates the use of summons as a last resort. 
 
Reaching the decision to pursue or discontinue the case: Techniques Žƌ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐ ? of 
NPM 
  
a) Policy objectives: Taking domestic abuse seriously 
 
A preferred technique of managerialism is the deployment of organisational objectives that 
establish preferred and consistent modes of working. In the area of intimate partner abuse, 
CPS guidelines immediately establish the climate;  ‘domestic abuse offences are regarded as 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ? (CPS, 2014). More precisely, as part of broader government Violence 
Against Women strategies, the CPS aims  ‘ƚŽďƌŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐƚŽũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
further protect victims of [domestic] abuse ? ?W^ ? ? ? ? ?a).  
 
There is no doubt that prosecutors in my sample considered domestic abuse distinct from 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐƌŝŵĞ ?ŽƌĂƐƐĂƵůƚ and the majority of prosecutors recited that domestic abuse 
ŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂ ‘ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ. When pressed about why domestic abuse holds this 
elevated status there was universal consensus about the  ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨ
offence. Several prosecutors made a link to the seriousness of the offence and the part the 
CPS must play in ending DA.   
 
 ‘tĞůů ?/ŵĞĂŶ ?ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ůĂƵŐŚƐ ?ĚĂƌĞ/ƐĂǇ ?ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚ ƐŝƐƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ?/ƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐŝŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
when people are vulnerable. It's not the sort of thing we can have in a civilised 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ŝƐŝƚ ?/ƚŚĂƐƚŽďĞƐƚĂŵƉĞĚŽƵƚĂŶĚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ? ? 
 
Prosecutor 3 added that effective prosecution and conviction through criminal law can be a 
means of expressing actual and figurative condemnation of certain behaviour thereby 
having deterrent effect. Mirroring policy principles, prosecutor 3 considered the CPS role to   
 
 ‘ƉƵƚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĨŽƌƵŵ ?/ƚŶĞĞĚƐƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚƐƚĂŵƉŽƵƚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ
abuse. Basically, they have been identified as cases that we need to do everything 
we can to actually get justice and see that they are being looked at correctly and 
ďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇĞǆƉůŽƌĞĂůůƐŽƌƚƐŽĨĂǀĞŶƵĞƐƚŽƚƌǇĂŶĚƐƚŽƉŝƚŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ? ? 
 
dŚĞƐĞĐůĂŝŵƐĂƌĞƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶƚŽĨWĂĐŬĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝŵĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?WĂĐŬĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŽĨ 
analysis by Michelle Madden-Dempsey (a former expert DA consultant to the CPS) 
concerning the role and value of criminal prosecutions. Specifically, they mirror Madden-
ĞŵƉƐĞǇ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌŝĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶŚĂǀŝŶŐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂůǀĂůƵĞŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŝƚ
results in actual consequences; for example, it might result in conviction and successive 
ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌŝŵĞŝƚƐĞůĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂŶǆŝĞƚǇĂďŽƵƚĐƌŝŵĞ
(Madden-Dempsey, 2009: 60). Prosecutions also articulate expressive value which is not 
consequential but intrinsic. This is akin to the symbolic value of denouncing wrong-doing 
and exculpating the victim. Madden-ĞŵƉƐĞǇƚŚŝŶŬƐŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ‘ĐŚĂƌŐĞ ?ĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ
preliminary expressive value through accusatorial denouncement whereas conviction offers 
more finality through concrete condemnation (Madden-Dempsey, 2009: 68). 
 
Both the consequential and intrinsic value of prosecuting domestic violence was iterated by 
prosecutor 6,  
 ‘IŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨŐŽŝŶŐ ?ŽŚǇĞĂŚ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐŐĞƚƌŝĚŽĨƚŚŝƐŽŶĞ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚ the 
implications of the wider community and the kind of rippling effect of how it will 
impact society as a whole. ? 
It is noteworthy that I identified prosecutor 6 as favouring tenacious prosecutions by 
regularly summonsing reluctant women to secure convictions. For this prosecutor, 
convictions were invariably considered the preferable outcome in domestic abuse cases. It is 
quite possible that her articulation of the role of criminal prosecutions as part of a greater 
pursuit to challenge the acceptability of intimate partner abuse in society generally has 
fuelled, or at least has supported her commitment to obtain convictions, through the use of 
summons whenever necessary. Madden-ĞŵƉƐĞǇ ?Ɛ understanding of the role of the 
prosecutor is directly referenced in the United Nations special rapporteur on violence 
against women report (United Nations 2009; 27). The CPS affirms and cites the report (CPS, 
2017a) which details that  ‘[f]or a State action to realize Q intrinsic value [of prosecutions], it 
must not be a one-off instance of condemnation, but in fact it must systematically engage 
ǁŝƚŚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĐŽŶĚĞŵŶŝƚ ? (United Nations 2009; 27). Discontinuing cases on 
request, it follows, is not a strategy readily advocated by the CPS. 
b) Deferring to management 
Managerialism encourages  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ďǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐconsistent working approaches to 
meet organisational goals. Consistency is typically achieved through the expansion of 
management personnel who are tasked with overseeing operations. If expectations about 
decision-making are clearly defined, and discretion is set within restrictive parameters, 
decision-making can become routinised and can effectively result in a de-skilling or 
ĚŽǁŶŐƌĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐŬŝůůĞĚǁŽƌŬĞƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞ(here the Crown Prosecutor) (Kilkauer, 2015). Flynn 
describes this in terms of a shrinkage of  ‘work autonomy ? or a  ‘de-professionalisation of 
expert labour ? (Flynn, 1999; 30). Where managers are ensuring reliable deployment of 
discretion in line with organisational objectives, their presence is likely to contribute to 
fewer decisions being made against the cultural grain and might be said to have a 
constraining effect on the professional workforce.  
The other way that decision-making powers of professionals might be curbed as a result of 
NPM is if managers themselves make the decision. Due to the seriousness with which 
domestic abuse is viewed within the service, most of the prosecutors interviewed were 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƐƵůƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌůŝŶĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘>Ğǀ ů ? ?ďĞĨŽƌĞƚĂŬŝŶŐĂŶǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽ
discontinue or terminate domestic abuse proceedings. Some more senior and experienced 
prosecutors informed me that they had previously been obliged to consult with their 
manager but recently were told they were no longer required to do so. Whilst this may 
appear to afford individual prosecutors discretion, the change appears to have taken place 
because these prosecutors were trusted to exercise their discretion in accordance with now 
familiar CPS policies, targets and management expectations. Confirming this, prosecutor 3, 
 ?ǁŚŽŶŽǁŚĂĚƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŚĞƌƐĞůĨ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝŶĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ
still set the tone for the decision you were likely to take. For her team,  
 ‘It tends to be, well, to be encouraged to apply for witness summonses, quite often. I 
think it depends who is, basically, the  ‘Level D ? at the time as towards the sort of 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǇŽƵƚĂŬĞ ? ?
,ĞƌĞŝŶĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŽŶŝƚƐĨĞĞƚ ? ? initially insisting managers 
take the decision and then reducing  ‘hierarchical decision-making ? (Jones, 1993; 188) to 
free-up valuable managerial time ŽŶĐĞƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?was established.  
c) Streamlining processes: Digitalisation 
The recent digitalisation of CPS case files and the consequent elŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƉĞƌ ĨŝůĞ ?
was intended to streamline and modernise processes in line with the tenets of 
managerialism; cost and time efficiency being paramount and maximising worker 
productivity. Digitalisation now sees prosecutors assigned a digital case load (Prosecutor 3 
indicated hers included 145 files) and each prosecutor is presented with a digital task list 
every day (Prosecutor 3 indicated that her task list that day was 7 pages long). With 
prosecutors aware that the volume of work being undertaken by them is now being 
monitored by managers, prosecutors described feeling under further pressure to complete 
daily task lists quickly. The time pressures imposed on prosecutors through digital working 
doubtless impact on the thoroughness with which information or evidence can be 
considered;  
  
 ‘dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶĞǀĞƌĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŝŵĞƚŽĚŽĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ QŝƚƐŽƌƚŽĨĨĞĞůƐůŝŬĞǇŽƵ ?ƌĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ?ŝƚ ?ƚŽŐĞƚŝƚĂůůĚŽŶĞƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ? ?12  
 
I have already suggested that demands for efficiency evolve routinised decision-making as 
WĂĐŬĞƌĂŶĚ'ĂƌůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐĂƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƐ ?WĂĐŬĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?'ĂƌůĂŶĚ ?
2001; 18). In domestic abuse cases, the use of summons represents an efficient solution to 
the obstacle of victim retraction because of the time saved avoiding a thorough 
consideration of victim risk assessment from a variety of sources (victim retraction 
statements, police risk assessments, Independent Domestic Violence Advocates 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŬŶŽǁŶƚŽƉŽůŝĐĞ ‘ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĐĂƌĞ ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?. Summons therefore 
achieves two NPM demands; it is time efficient and it simultaneously espouses the 




Since 2010, the coalition and Conservative governments have governed through a political 
logic of austerity, a priority which, just as NPM, makes ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĨŽƌ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?. Austerity, a 
political rather than an economic concept (Bramall et al, 2016), aims to return economic 
ƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞďƵƚĂƌŐƵĂďůǇ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇŝůůŝƚĞƌĂƚĞ ? 
(Bramall et al, 2016; 121) ?ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŵĞĂŶƐ ?dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝƚƐĞůĨ
rarely prefers the term, rather it is a label that is ascribed by others to describe the 
 ‘ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚƐĞǀĞƌĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐĐƵƚƐ ? ?ƌĂŵĂůůĞƚĂů ? 2016; 119) designed to significantly 
reduce budgetary deficits in preference to raising funds through taxation. As managerialism 
is specifically designed to facilitate cost-efficiency, EWD ?Ɛ methods gain particular credence 
in times of austerity. Budgetary cuts are presented in terms of efficiency savings. 
 
The CPS experienced a £185 million cut to their budget between 2009 and 2015 (Hansard, 
2017). Such cuts play into the hands of managerial techniques that already prioritise 
efficient returns from limited means. Prosecutors I interviewed were under no doubt that 
budgetary cuts, attributed to austerity measures, contributed to the pressure they felt to 
undertake work expeditiously. Prosecutor 2 noted that,  
  
 ‘>ots of people have gone. It just seems to me that there is a smidgen of what was 
left. I mean, I know that you are told that there is less magistrate's work now, but it 
doesn't feel like it. It sort of still feels like you are working against the line to get it all 
done quickly ?.  
 
Prosecutor 2 was correct that the numbers of cases brought to magistrates ? courts 
nationwide declined by just over 100 000 in the period 2010- 2015, falling from 641 000 
cases to 539 000 (Hansard, 2017).13 Prosecutors are also likely to be accurate, however, 
when they identify that they have no sense that the number of cases that must be prepared 
by each individual prosecutor has reduced. This is because between 2010 and 2015, 2 400 
members of staff left the service, largely through voluntary redundancies, in order to meet 
the 40% reduction in the staffing budget in the same period (Hansard, 2017). 
 
/ŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚŽƉƉŝŶŐ ?14 reduction in staff numbers, it is clear how the need to 
make efficient and expeditious decisions, with almost factory like predictability, becomes 
acute. Operating with a working presumption that reluctant victims will be summonsed, 
short-circuits the need to engage in the time intense detailed analysis of the possible merits 
of doing so, whilst simultaneously expressing condemnation as required by policy 
objectives.  
 
e) Statistical analysis 
 
Monitoring and surveying performance and target attainment through means of 
computerised bureaucracy is characteristic of NPM. To facilitate appraisal of domestic abuse 
cases (notably the conviction rate), domestic abuse must be  ‘ĨůĂŐŐĞĚ ?on the CPS computer 
system.  ‘&ůĂŐŐŝŶŐ ?ĂĐĂƐĞŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚĂĐŽůŽƵƌĞĚŵĂƌŬĞƌĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŽŶƚŚĞĚŝŐŝƚĂůĐĂƐĞĨŝůĞƐŽ
that it is readily identifiable as domestic abuse (as defined by the Home Office) and 
outcomes can be collated. All prosecutors in the sample ǁĞƌĞĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ĨůĂŐŐŝŶŐ ?ĞŶĂďůĞĚ
ƚŚĞW^ƚŽĐŽŵƉŝůĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĞĚ ‘ĂƐĂŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ? ?
Statistics were largely considered a concern for managers but nonetheless prosecutors 
described how statisƚŝĐƐ ‘ĨŝůƚĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ?ƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?^ŽŵĞƉƌŽƐ ĐƵƚŽƌƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ
that statistics were emailed for information purposes only. Others received an explanation 
of how  ‘well ? the team were doing in prosecuting domestic abuse and what they needed to 
be aware of  ‘ŵŽǀŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ?ďĞĂƌŝŶŐŝŶŵŝŶĚ ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ?ƚŚĂƚĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ ? ?
CPS areas are ranked. Tables are compiled comparing the 13 CPS area conviction rates and 
are readily circulated and available. Here, clearly visible, is evidence of how the CPS, in the 
absence of external competitors, ŝƐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚƚŽĐŽŵƉĞƚĞǁŝƚŚŝƚƐĞůĨĨŽƌďĞƐƚ ‘ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ?ŝŶ
line with the tenets of New Public Managerialism. 
  
For one prosecutor the culture that statistical analysis of cases imbued was not one that sat 
comfortably with her, 
 
 ‘/ ?ǀĞŶĞǀĞƌďĞĞŶĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƐŽ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚ- ŝƚ ?ƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ/ŐĞƚƐŽĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞW^ ?/ŚĂǀĞƚŽƐĂǇ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂůůabout, to me it just seems like it is all 
ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĂŶĚƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƚƐŽ
ŵƵĐŚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?/ ?ǀĞŶĞǀĞƌďĞĞŶĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƐŽ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚŐŽĞƐŽŶŝŶ
these management meetings and how much it is drummed into you but I always get 
the impression that it is very very important that targets are met and numbers of 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐƵĐŚĂŶĚƐƵĐŚ ? ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ? ? 
 
This seems to mirror the notion that New Public Managerialism constructs the public as 
consumer in the sense that what becomes prioritised is not so much meeting individual 
needs in an ideological or principled way so much as meeting market demands for efficient 
 ‘ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? (Jones, 1993) and performativity. In the case of the CPS this is measurable through, 
inter alia, the conviction rate. There was a sense amongst prosecutors that the CPS are 
always monitoring area performance, particularly as compared to other CPS areas. 




ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƌĂƚĞĨĂůůŝŶŐŽƌĚƌŽƉƉŝŶŐŽƌǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝƚ ? ? 
 
These auditing processes are also the means by which parliament can hold the Crown 
Prosecution Service to account. The ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŚŝĞĨ>ĞŐĂůĚǀŝƐŽƌ, the Attorney 
General, oversees the work of the Director of Public Prosecutions and her organisation and 
is answerable to parliament for CPS performance. Rates of CPS convictions or 
discontinuances are also used by the Justice Select Committee that examines CPS 
expenditure, administration and policy. The Committee is tasked with publishing reports 
that government must respond to, to explain or justify how iƚŝƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌƐ ?ŵŽŶĞǇ ?
However, if it is the CPS as an institution that is being held accountable to parliament for 
conviction rates by virtue of such statistical tracking, how are decisions of individual 
prosecutors affected? I identified two ways individual prosecutorial decision-making is 
impacted by the monitoring of area or nationwide statistics.  
 
The first way is through an institutional-wide response which might be triggered if a set of 
statistics indicated, for instance, a slump in conviction rates. In such circumstances 
prosecutor 2 suggested that the CPS might react by rolling out compulsory training amongst 
prosecutors to address the issue. Such training has the potential to instil a wider cultural 
shift in the service, as evidenced in 2005- 2008. dŚŝƐĐŚŝŵĞƐǁŝƚŚEWD ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐĞƚĂŶĚ
implement organisational strategies which have the effect of controlling public servants 
(prosecutors) and regulating professional independence (Exworthy and Halford, 1999).  
 
f) Risk and responsibility 
 
In addition to prompting changes to institutional wide practice and culture, the second way 
poor performance figures might affect prosecutorial decision-making is through 
management scrutiny of individual decisions. Prosecutor 7 understood that a poor monthly 
performance might probe further investigation by managers into particular files. Individual 
cases might be analysed and questions asked about why the case was dropped. In any 
event, a more thorough examination of prosecutorial decision making takes place in all 
cases that are recorded as ĂŶ ‘ĂĚǀĞƌƐĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ? ?ŶĂĚǀĞƌƐĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ
prosecutor 1, is anything that does not result in the defendant being convicted of at least 
one offence and is an  ‘unsuccessful ? outcome; whether discontinued, withdrawn, offered no 
evidence, dismissed at half time or after full trial. ůů ‘ĂĚǀĞƌƐĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?ĂƌĞƐƚƵĚŝĞĚďǇ
managers to establish the reasons for not obtaining a conviction and to see if 
 ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞen made (Prosecutor 6). Prosecutor 9 confirmed that,  
 
 ‘Adverse outcomes are particularly looked at to see why. Was it a case of a victim 
ŶŽƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽĐŽƵƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?/ƐŝƚĂĐĂƐĞƚŚĞ
ǀŝĐƚŝŵĐĂŵĞƚŽĐŽƵƌƚďƵƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĐŽŵĞƵƉƚŽƉƌŽŽĨ ?Žƌ ?ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŐŝǀĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞǀĞƌǇǁĞůů ?
 Q /ƚ ?ƐƚŚĂƚĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇůŽŽŬĂƚĂƐƚŽǁŚǇĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĨŽƌǁĂŶƚŽĨĂďĞƚƚĞƌ
ǁŽƌĚ ?ĨĂŝůĞĚ ?tŚǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁĞƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞǇůŽŽŬƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǁĞĐĂŶ
ůĞĂƌŶĂŶǇůĞƐƐŽŶƐĨƌŽŵŝƚ ? ? (Prosecutor 9) 
 
That being so, prosecutors in the sample were mindful that any decision they took that 
might contribute to a reduction in the conviction rate, might be open to inquiry. If a case 
fails on the day of trial because a summons was not secured then this may be interpreted as 
inaction on the part of the prosecutor. Conversely, if a woman has been summonsed and 
fails to answer the summons then the prosecutor has done everything within their power 
(short of issuing a warrant for her arrest) and cannot be criticised.  
 
One ĂƌĞĂĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞ ‘ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝĨĂƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌĚŝĚŶŽƚƐƵŵŵŽŶƐŝƚ
would not lead to automatic criticism because of growing awareness that summonsing may 
not necessarily be preferable, particularly if it discourages women to seek help from 
criminal justice agencies in the future. Nonetheless even she accepted that prosecutors 
realised that adverse outcome cases would be examined more rigorously than cases that 
resulted in conviction and that prosecutors would feel or could be held accountable for 
decisions leading to acquittals. In short, if a prosecutor fails to push for a domestic abuse 
conviction, the decision will be one that is scrutinised and the prosecutor will need to have 
justified the decision in their written review of the case. Managerial appraisal of files 
therefore contributed to a sense of professional and personal responsibility to meet 
organisational objectives. Here, again, evidence of the effect of NPM, which demands 
ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƉŽůŝĐǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ?ĂŶĚŚŽůĚs those 
tasked with delivering standards and guidelines to account through regular monitoring and 
inspections (Garland, 2001: 120).  
 
As a result, what seems to be implied here is how NPM can create a culture of fear and 
insecurity. Prosecutor 4 confirmed that when making the decision to summons,  
 
 ‘ ?Prosecutors] will think of themselves, individually, first of all. They are all civil 
servants and they want to cover their backs. First rule. ? 
 
Prosecutor 1 agreed that relying automatically on ƐƵŵŵŽŶƐŝƐƚŚĞůĞĂƐƚ ‘ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ?ŽƉƚŝŽŶ
for prosecutors because they have demonstrated understanding that every option must be 
explored ƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶ ‘ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞdomestic abuse victim and criminal sanctions for the 
defendant. Summons, he surmised, 
 
  ‘ĂďƐŽůǀĞƐƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌŵĂŬŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ [not to prosecute] ? (prosecutor 1). 
 Manager repercussions were feared not only in relation to professional criticism for 
inadequate decision making. The fear also included how management would criticise them 
should something happen to the victim in the future where a case had been terminated 
 ‘prematurely ?:   
 
 ‘tŚĂƚĂůǁĂǇƐƵƐĞĚƚŽǁŽƌƌǇŵĞǁas, you know, am I going to get one of these cases 
ǁŚĞƌĞŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŐŽĂŚĞĂĚŽƌǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞŝƚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ QĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƐŚĞ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽ
be murdered. People are going to say, sorry you were the SCP.15 ,ŽƌƌĞŶĚŽƵƐ Q ?
(prosecutor 8).  
 
When asked if that meant that blame might be apportioned to the individual prosecutor if a 
pre-ceding case had been dropped, she replied,  
 
 ‘/ƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞW^ƚŽĂĨĂƵůƚƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?dŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚũƵƐƚŚĂŶŐǇŽƵŽƵƚƚŽĚƌǇ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ
ƚŚĞǇ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ ? ? 
 
Indicating that he did not prefer the practice of routine summonsing, prosecutor 1 
suggested that this was because he had had some management experience and concluded 
that he was probably more self-assured in his decision making than other people might be. 
However, even he recognised the potential for repercussions,  
 
  ‘TŽƵĐŚǁŽŽĚ/ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŚĂĚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĐŽŵĞďĂĐŬƚŽďŝƚĞŵĞǇĞƚ ? ?
 
When prompted to expand he answered,  
 
 ‘/ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞŝĨǇŽƵƌĞĂůůǇƐĂƚĂŶĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĂďŽƵƚĞǀĞƌǇĐĂƐĞ ?ǇŽƵǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŚŝƐƐůŝŐŚƚ
concern that, you know, the victim could be, I don't know, subject to a further 
serious or even fatal assault. But, we are dealing with so many of these cases, you 
know, on a daily basis that you have to kind of just get on with it. ? 
 
For this experienced and senior prosecutor, whilst being aware of the gravity of the decision 
he was taking, distancing himself from responsibility for any future harm that may come to 
the victim was the sensible and pragmatic approach to take.  
 
As NPM demands efficiency and speed to achieve cost effectiveness, prosecutors develop 
strategies of coping with demands of heavy workloads. As domestic abuse caseloads require 
engagement with the cruelty and barbarity of others, one way productivity might be 
maintained is by resisting full engagement with the suffering contained in the ǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?Ɛ
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐĚŽŶŽƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽĐŽƉĞǁŝƚŚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŵƵƐƚ
informally manage its impact (Ellison and Munro, 2017; 198). By practising emotional 
ĚĞƚĂĐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞ ‘ǀŝĐĂƌŝŽƵƐƚƌĂƵŵĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ allows prosecutors 
to step aside from feelings of guilt and responsibility (Ellison and Munro, 2017), perhaps 
evident with Prosecutor 1 cited above. Decision-ŵĂŬĞƌƐĐĂŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ‘ĚĞƚĂĐŚment, disbelief 
ĂŶĚĚĞŶŝĂůŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂǀŽŝĚ QďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůůǇŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƌŽƵƚŝŶĞůǇĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚ ? (Ellison and Munro, 2017; 
198). This emotional detachment or disengagement with shocking occurrences is a habit 
that understandably evolves for the purposes of self-protection but it inevitably means that 
victim accounts feel unreal and the severity or even veracity of what has been experienced 
by the victim is diluted.  
 
In the context of prosecuting domestic abuse within NPM constraints, crucial coping 
strategies avert the need to re-live or imagine the details of a crime but this can result in a 
withdrawal from engaging with the needs of the victim or from a detailed assessment of 
what might facilitate her  ‘capability set ? ?EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ? ? ? ? ? ?. /ŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚůůŝƐŽŶĂŶĚDƵŶƌŽ ?Ɛ
 ‘ƚƌĂƵŵĂ-ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚůĞŶƐ ? ?routinely summonsing allows prosecutors to demonstrate a 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ?whilst ensuring a measure of emotional 
self-preservation. Detachment also preserves and permits clarity of thought which facilitates 
efficient professional decision making and task completion. Withdrawing emotionally from 
the details of the abuse therefore serves the prosecutor in effecting expeditious decisions 
and assists in managing the pressures of managerial targets, high workloads and the impacts 





The principles and practices of New Public Managerialism have been evident in the English 
and Welsh criminal justice system since at least the mid-1990s (McGlaughlin et al, 2001). 
Three key strategies have been deployed since then; modernisation, efficiency and financial 
prudence; target setting, performance monitoring and managerial accountability and lastly 
increased standardisation in policies and practices which has the effect of curbing the 
decision-making autonomy of its professionals (Raine and Willson, 1997: 82). This article has 
drawn out the ways in which NPM ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ, often in unacknowledged 
ways, to influence how 9 prosecutors in the South of England make decisions in cases of 
intimate partner abuse where the victim no longer supports criminal prosecution. 
 
The data uncovers a  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?, present in 2017 amongst the sample, that can be 
summarised as a tendency for Crown Prosecutors to routinely rely on summonsing reluctant 
victims of intimate partner abuse to give evidence at trial. This approach appears to have 
emerged since 2008. ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽƐŽĨƚ ‘ŶŽ-ĚƌŽƉ ? ?ƵǌĂǁĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?Žƌ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?EŝĐŚŽůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐŽĨƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵ-ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
advocated in CPS policy and guidelines. The potential consequences for victims of routinely 
relying on summons include overlooking risks to her safety during the course of proceedings 
or immediately afterwards (Catteneo et al, 2009), the risk that she no longer trusts the 
criminal justice system to act in her best interests in the future (Buzawa, 2000) or the risk 
that the coercive behaviour of her abuser is simply replaced with coercive practices of the 
state (Mills, 1999) thereby undermining her own emotional well-being and belief in her 
ability to be autonomous (Winick, 2000).  
 
The article proposes ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? to the extent that it is identified amongst the sample. It uncovers how concealed, 
tacit and hitherto unacknowledged strategies of New Public Managerialism contribute to a 
prosecutorial reliance on summons. At its core NPM seeks efficiency and service delivery in 
line with organisational objectives and targets. As achieving high rates of convictions in 
domestic abuse cases is celebrated (CPS, 2017a) the article explains that the routine use of 
summons serves as an expeditious yet effective way of meeting managerial demands for 
efficiency whilst effecting CPS policy objectives.  
 
If the primary research reveals a prosecutorial practice habitually disinclined to adhere to a 
victim ?ƐƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƚŽƚĞƌŵŝŶĂte proceedings, the sample also reveals preliminary indications 
that the  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ practice ? may not enjoy wholehearted support from many prosecutors. 
Moreover, following recent training in 2016- 17, three out of nine prosecutors were 
reluctant to accept that routine summons persisted in the service. Instead, they suggested 
that  ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵůĞƐƐƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚĂŶĚeach case was being reviewed on 
its own terms. Whilst there remained a presumption in favour of prosecuting domestic 
abuse cases, they indicated a nuanced balancing exercise based on information provided 
from victims, police and third parties was taking place where complainants were 
unsupportive. Thus, there is some evidence from the research that positive and sensitive 
change- towards ĂŵŽƌĞŶƵĂŶĐĞĚŽƌ ‘ƐƵƌvivor-definĞĚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐh to prosecuting domestic 
abuse- is afoot. This marks a move towards the stated CPS approach to prosecuting 
domestic abuse (CPS, 2014) and appears to be taking place, albeit at a preliminary stage, 




See title page 
 
Declaration of Conflicting Interests  
The author declares her previous employment at the Crown Prosecution Service between 
2007 and 2014 and her continued employment as a freelance advocate appearing in court 
on behalf of the Crown Prosecution Service since 2014. 
 
Funding  
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, 
and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by the Kent Law School 50th 
Anniversary Research Scholarship. 
 
Notes 
1 1 in 3 cases that do not result in conviction come as a result of victim retraction, non-attendance at 
trial or turning hostile as compared to 1 in 10 for other crimes (CPS, 2016). 
2 A Crown Prosecutor has discretion to discontinue a case under s23 Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985. 
3 /ƵƐĞƚŚĞƉƌŽŶŽƵŶ ‘ŚĞƌ ?ĂƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽW^ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?-16, 83.3% (71, 706) of domestic 
abuse victims were women, as compared to 16.7% (14,406) men (CPS, 2016). 
4 ƐƉĞƌdŚĞWƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƐŽĚĞƚŚŝƐ ‘ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůƚĞƐƚ ?ŝƐ the first test that must be passed before 
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƚĞƐƚŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŝŶ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ƚŽƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞ ?W^ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
5 Hearsay evidence may be admissible by virtue of s116(2)e Criminal Justice Act 2003 if the victim is 
in fear or s114(1)d if it is considered in the  ‘interests of justice ? to do so. 
6 The court has power to issue a summons under s169 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. 
7 For a comprehensive account of NPM as it affects social work, health services and education see 
Exworthy M and Halford S (1999) Professionals and the New Managerialism in the Public Sector. Open 
University Press. For an account of NPM in British local government see for example, Gerry Stoker 
(1999) The New Management of British Local Governance. Macmillan. 
8 dŚĞW^ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ‘ŽƌĞYƵĂůŝƚǇ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?ŝŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞŶĂŵĞĚ ‘ĂƐĞǁŽƌŬYƵĂůŝƚǇ
Standards in 2014) CPS, Casework Quality Standards available at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/casework_quality_standards/index.html (accessed 31 October 
2017). 
9 In the CPS, Crown Prosecutors and Senior Crown Prosecutors fall into teams managed by District 
Crown Prosecutors overseen by Assistant Chief Crown Prosecutors managed by Chief Crown 
Prosecutors who are accountable to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Area Business Managers 
also assist the Chief Crown Prosecutors. It is notable that managerialism is characterised by 
unrelenting organisational restructuring in its quest for streamlined working; the CPS has seen 
countless reconfigurations of its management structures and organisation. 
10 ƵǌĂǁĂĞƚĂů ?Ɛ 2000 report outlined findings from the Quincey District Court project which 
observed 353 abused women over a period of 7 months. The report notes that women who 
experienced no-drop prosecution policies were 2.5 times less likely to report recidivist abuse in the 
proceeding 6 months. 
11 The sample comprised 6 women and 3 men (6 Senior Crown Prosecutors, 1 Crown Prosecutor and 
1 Associate Prosecutor).  
12 As a domestic abuse champion, this prosecutor had enjoyed attending joint meetings with police, 
courts and IDVAs. These meetings were forums where best practice was disseminated and poor 
practice considered. They no longer take place according to Prosecutor 9. 
13 WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁŽƌĚƐ ? ‘/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŝŵĞƚŽĚŽĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƐĂŝĚ ?
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